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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DeLUXE GLASS COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaixntiff and Respond;ent
vs.
GEORGE \T. MARTIN, doing business as
Commercial Building Company, CAPSON-BOWMAN, INC., a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents
GENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF
AMERICA, a corp·oration,
Defenaamt and App1ellant
A. BERNSTEIN; ANDERSO·N L.UMBER
COMPANY, a corporation; J. HENRY
CHAPMAN and GEORGE A. CHAP~1AN, co-partners, doing business as
CHAPMAN PL.UMBING AND HEATING CO·~fPANY; MILL CREEK L·UMBER AND TRANSIT MIX CO·MP ANY,
a corporation; MOR.RIS.ON-MERRILL
C 0 M P A N Y, a corporation; R I 0
GRANDE LUMBER COMPANY, a
corporation; R. H. MULHO·LLAND;
and WII.1FORD W. GARDNER,
Int-erveners and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE

Case No.

7281

CA~s.E

This is an appeal by the defendant General Casualty
Company of America, from a judgment of the Third
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

District Court, in favor of the plaintiff and the interveners and against defendant Casualty Company, in the
total sum $6,586.11 ; and from a judgment in favor of
defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc., against defendant
Casualty Company in the cross-complaint of the defendant Casualty Company against its co-defendant, Capson-Bowman, Inc.
·The appellant also appeals from orders of the trial
court denying its Motion for New Trial, and denying its
Motion to Amend, Modify, and Add to the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law theretofore entered by
the Court.
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS
This action was commenced by the plaintiff against
the defendants in July, 1947, (R. 1). Upon the Stipulation of C.ounsel (R. 19-20) the Court entered an order
of intervention permitting the various interveners to
intervene in this ·case, and to file p1leadings setting forth
their claims. (R. 18-19).
So far as the issues of this ap·peal are concerned,
the plaintiff and the various interve:q.ers stand on the
same footing, and therefore, for -convenience, we shall
hereafter refer to the plaintiff and interveners 0ollectively as plaintiffs.
There is no serious dispute as to the facts, though
there may be some slight dispute as to the inferences
to be drawn from certain admitted facts. No testimony
was taken at the trial. The facts are established by the
al'lega tions and admissions of the various pleadings, and
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by the Stipulation of facts entered into by Counsel for
the various parties (R. 348-350, 342-343).
The -appellant's general Demurrer to the C:omplaint
filed by the De Luxe Glass Company was sustained (R.
122) and thereafter amended comp,laints were filed by all
the plaintiffs (R. 133-164, 189-275A, 299-304).
The amended complaint of the DeLuxe Glass Company was in four counts. The material allegations of
the first count set forth that the defendant Martin was
a general building construction contractor; that defendant Casualty Company (appellant) is a Washington
Corporation, regularly doing business in the State of
Utah; ~that defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc., owned certain land at 3000 South Highland Driv~e in Sal~t Lake City,
and that such land was improved by a store building
erected by defendant Martin pursuant to a certain contract between Martin and Capson-Bowman; that by the
terms of the -contract Martin was to receive $30,000
for such construction work, to he paid as follows:
''On or about the 1st and 15th day of each
month 90% of the value, based on the contract
prices, of labor and materia'ls incorporated in the
work and of materials suitably stored at the site
thereof to the 1st and 15th day of that month, as
estimated by the architect, less the aggregate of
P'revious payments; and upon substantial completion of the entire work, a sum sufficient to
increase the total payments to 90% of the contract price. Before above payments are made
the contractor shall furnish lien waivers for all
labor and material covered by such payments.''
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Attached to and by reference incorporated in the
Complaint was a copy of the building contract. It was
further alleged in the compiaint that by the terms of
the contract the contractor (Martin) should provide
and pay for all labor and materials; and that if the
contractor failed to make promp·t payment to sub-contra~tors for material and labor, the owner (CapsonBowman) might terminate the employment of the
contractor.
The Complaint further alleged the execution and
delivery to defendant Martin by the defendant Casualty
Company of the following bond:
''PERFORMANCE BOND
(Construction)
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,
That we, MR. GEORGE V. MARTIN, d.h.a COMMER.CIAL BUILDING COMP'ANY, as Principal,
and G·ENERAL CASUALTY COMPANY OF
AMERICA, as Surety, are held and firmly bound
unto CAP·SON-BO·WMAN REAL'TY COMPANY
hereinafter called the Obligee, in the penal sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND AND N0/100 dollars for
the payment of v1hich sum well and truly to be
made we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors, adn1inistrators, and successors, jointly and severally, firmly by these presents.
THE CONDITION OF THIS OBLIGATION
IS SUCH, that whereas the Principal entered into
a certain con tract, hereto attached, with the 0 bligee, d8Jted Sept·ember 26, 1945, for construction
of grocery store and drug store complete for fixtures, per plans and specifications. Located at
3000 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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NOW, THEREFORE, if the Principal shall
"yell and truly perforn1 and fulfill all the undertaki:p.gs, covenants, terms, eonditions, and agreements of said contract during the original term of
said contract and any extensions thereof that n1ay
be granted by the Obligee, with or without notice
to the Surety, and during the life of any guaranty
required under the con tract, and shall also well
and truly perform and fulfill all the undertakings,
covenants, terms, conditions and agreements of
any and all duly authorized modifications of said
contract that may hereafter he made, notice of
such modifications to the Surety being hereby
waived, then, this obligation to be void; otherwise
to remain in full force and virtue.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the abovebounden 'P'arties have executed this instrument
under their several seals this 26th day of September, 1945, the name and corporate seal .of eaeh
eorporate p·arty being hereto affixed and these
presents duly signed by its undersigned representative, pursuant to authority of its governing
body.
In presence of
R. ,r. Hodgen
COMMERCIAL BUILDING COMPANY,
By Geo. V. Martin (Seal)
(Individual Principal)
Salt Lake City, Utah
(Business Address)
GENERAL CASUALTY COl\1:P ANY OF
AMERICA
(Corporate S:urety
Salt Lake City, Utah
Business Address)·
By Ruth Miller Corporate Seal
(Corporate Seal)
Attorney-in-fact"
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At this time we invite the attention of the Court
to the fact that Capson-Bowman is the only party named
as obligee in the bond, and that no reference is made
to laborers, materialmen or subcontractors, and that
the bond is not -conditioned for the payment of laborers
and materialmen.
The Complaint further aJlleged that Martin ·engaged
plaintiff to furnish and install all necessary glass in
the store building, contracted to be ereeted, and that
plaintiff furnished such glass and Martin agreed to
pay the reasonable value thereof, to-wit: $1,870.00, and
that such amount was then due to plaintiff and unpaid.
. In the second, third, and fourth counts, plaintiff
sued as assignee of other sub-contractors, laborers, and
materialmen. Thes~ counts were, insofar as material
to this case, identical to the first count. Plaintiff p1rayed
judgment against all defendants (R. 133-158).
The Amended Complaints filed by the other plaintiffs were patterned after that of the DeLuxe Glass
Company, and so far as material to this controversy
were identical to it. (R. 189-275 A; 299-304).
To the various Amended Complaints, the defendant
interposed general Demurrers (R. 169-170, 187, 27·6-282),
which Demurrers were by the Court overruled. (R. 290).
Thereafter, defendant Ca.pson-Bowman filed an
Answer to the various Amended Complaints, admitting
practically all of the facts therein alleged, except the
value of the labor perform·ed and/or material furnished,
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and non-payment of the same. Capson-Bowman also
alleged, by way of affirmative defense, payment to the
Contractor (l\Iartin) of all of the contract :price excep·t
$2,188.33, which sum it was ready and willing to pay
upon satisfactory completion of the work; that on information and belief, plaintiffs were entitled to some
sum, the amoun·t of which was unknown to Capson-Bowman, from defendant Martin, and Capson-Bowman, ther:efore paid the unpaid balance of the eontract p·rice into
Court; that prior to the commencement of the work by
Marlin, Capson-Bowman had obtained from him the bond
refer:ved to in the eomrpilaint, ·cond!tioned upon the farthful
performance of the contract and executed hy defendant
Casualty Company; that Cap·son-Bowman exhibited said
bond upon request of any interested person and that it
had fully complied with the provisions of 'Title 17,
Chapter 2, U. C. A. 1943; that it was the intent and purpose of the various parties defendant a.t the time the
bond was executed to thereby protect laborers and materialmen, and that any unpaid claims of any of the
plaintiffs for labor and material should be satisfied by
the defendant Casualty Company, and Cap.son-Bowman
should be relieved of all liability ( R. 307-317) .
Capson-Bowman also filed a cross-complaint against
its co-defendant Casualty Company, by which it sought
to place the burden of any judgment which might be
entered against cross-complainant upon the defendant
Caualty Company. No facts, not previously stated, were
alleged in the Cross-Complaint, and therefore, we do
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not deem it necessary to detail the allegations of that
pleading (R. 318-320).
Defendant Casualty Company filed separate answers to each of the Amended Complaints, admitting
most of the allegations, and alleging that the bond
executed hy it was conditioned only for the performance
and compl·etion of the building eontract between Cap,sonBowman and George V. Martin; that defendant CapsonBowman failed to comp~ly with the terms of S;ection
17-2-1, U.C.A., 1943, in failing to obtain a bond conditioned for the ''prompt payment for material furnished
and 'labor performed, under the contract'' ; that by reason
thereof defendant Casualty Company was not liable to
plaintiff for labor and material furnished, hut that defendant Capson-Bowman was liable to said plaintiffs
for labor and material furnished; that the bond above
referred to "\vas a performance bond running solely to
Capson-Bowman and conditioned upon com:pletion of
the building in accordance with the terms of the contract, and the bond contained no p·rovision for the payment of laborers and materialmen. (R. 375-377)
Defendant Casualty Company a:lso filed a CrossComplaint against its co-defendant, Cap-son-Bowman,
alleging many of the facts heretofore stated, and further
alleging that Capson-B·owman breached that portion of
its contract with Martin whereby Capson-Bowman
agreed to withhold payments from the contractor until
the contractor should furnish lien waivers for all labor
and materials covered hy such payments; that CapsonBowman, without requiring Martin to furnish it with
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lien waivers, made payments from time to time ''far in
excess of the amount of such lien waivers ·as were- furnished to it''; that Cap,son-Bowman further violated the
contract '"'ith Martin by making "p.ayments in excess
of 90% of the contract price prior to substantial completion of the entire vvork"; and that such acts were
prejudicial to the Casualty Company and by reason
thereof the Casualty Company was released from its
obligation under the bond. (R. 377 -382).
By Stipulation of the parties it was agreed that
there remained due and unpaid to the respective plaintiffs for labor and materials under the contract between
Martin and Capson-Bowman the following amounts for
labor performed and materials furnished, together with
interest at 6% per annum from the dates indicated:
De Luxe Glass Com~pany
First Cause of Action.. $1,870.00
Second Cause of Action 1,149.75
Third Cause of Action__ 933.50
Fourth Cause of Action 1,710.00
~fill Creek Lumber and
Transit Mix Company__
16.59
Morrison-Merrill Co.________ 232.90
Wilford W. Gardner ________ 1;646.39
Rio Grande Lumber Co.__
·61.54
R. H. Mulholland____________.____
98.01
A. Bernstein________________________ 198.92
78.69
Anderson Lumber Co.______
Chapman Plumbing and
Heating Co. ___________________ _ 23.36 ·

Dec. 22, 1946
Mar.11,1947
Mar.25,1947
Jan. 6, 1947
Mar.26,1947
Feb. 17, 1947
Jan. 30, 1947
Oct. 19, 1946
Jan. 28, 1947
Oct. 25, 1946
Nov. 15, 1946
S·ept. 6, 1946

Total ------------------------·----$8,019. 76
( R. 342-343)
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It was further stipulated between the various defendants that the contract p·rice with additions and
deductions was $32,406.00. Payments were made by
Cap·s-on-Bowman as fol1ows:
Nov. 27, 1945 to Martin ------------------------------$ 411.60
Mar. 2, 1946 to Martin --------------------·------------ 6,553.23
May 11, 1946 to Martin ------------------------------ 2, 722.31
July 8, 1946 to Martin -------------------------------- 2,47 4.50
Aug. 17, 1946 to Martin ------------------------------ 2,977.00
Sep. 6, 1946 to .Martin -------------------------------- 2,183.28
Sep.. 20, 1946 to Martin -------------------------------- 5,245.20
Oct. 21, 1946 to Martin and
Seegmiller Elec. Co. ---· -------------------------- 1,100.00
Oct. 21, 1946 to Martin and
Hansen N eiderhauser Co. -------------------- 948.86
Oct. 21, 1946 to Martin and Utah
Lumber Company ------------------------------------ 119.19
O·ct. 21, 1946 to Martin and
L. N. Plant _____ ------------------------__________ -----·---- 292.20
Nov. 7, 1946 to Martin and
F. N. Ellis ------------------------------------------------ 154.71
Nov. 22, 1946 to Martin .----------------------------- 3,063.17
Jan. 17, 1947 to Martin and
E. C. Kimball ----------------·---------------------------- 150.00
Jan. 17, 1947 to Martin and
Pons and Davis ---------------------------------------- 386.70
Jan. 17, 1947 to Martin and
Romney Lumber Company -------------------- 390.45
Sep. 20, 1947 to Clerk of Third
District Court ______________ ------------------------------ 2,188.31
To tal ____ --------·--___________________________________ .$32,406. 00
It was further stipulated between :the defendants
that no liens, or ~laims of liens were filed by any laborers or materialmen; that work commenced on the build-
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ing about September 27, 19±5, and the building was sufficiently completed on November 1, 1946 to be occupied
in part, and the rest of the building \vas ready for occupancy about January 15, 1947. There were still inoomplete items on ~larch 3, 1947, all of which were thereafter completed. (R. 348-350)
Defendant
Court. (R. 405)

~Iartin

confessed judgment In open

At the trial the construction contract (Ex. 1), the
performance hond (Ex. 3) and the cheeks and lien
waivers (Ex. 5) were received in evidence without objection. The case was submitted to the Court on the
pleadings, stipulations of counsel, and the exhibits. No
testimony was offered.
On the issues raised by the comp:laints and answers
thereto, the Court made findings of fact substantially
in accord with the admitted allegations of the pleadings
and the stipulations of counsel. The conclusions of Law
were to the effect that the amount paid into C·ourt by
Capson-Bowman should be divided among plaintiffs, pro
rata; that Capson-Bowman, in obtaining the bond of
Martin as principal and the Casualty Company as surety
complied with the provisions of Title 17, Chap.ter 2,
U.C.A., 1943; that :plaintiffs had a right of action against
defendant Casualty Company on its bond and were entitled to r·eeover from the Casualty Company for the
an1ount owed to them by the contractor; that Cap·sonBo\vman was not liable to any of the plaintiffs; that
~f artin (contractor) was liable to plaintiff for the
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amounts remaining unpaid to them after application of
the amount paid into Court by Capson-Bowman and were
entitled to judgment accordingly, and that defendant
Casualty Company was liable to the same extent as
Martin ( R. 355-361).
On the issues raised by the Casualty Company's
cross-complaint against Capson-Bowman the Court found
that ceTtain :payments made by Cap~son-Bowman to the
contractor were made without retention of the 10%
prescribed by the contract provisions; that there was
no evidence that the Casualty Company was prejudiced
by the failure of Capson-B·owman to comp:ly with the
retention provisions of the contract, and the Casualty
Company was not prejudiced or damaged by the failure
of Capson-Bowman to comply with the terms of the contract; and that defendant Capson-Bowman fully performed its construction contract with Martin. (R. 362363). Fr'om the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court
concluded that the Casualty Company was not entitled
to any recovery on its Cross-Comp,laint (R. 363).
The Casualty Company proposed amendm·ents and
additions to the Findings of Fact and C~onclusions of
Law to the effect that the bond of the Casualty Company
was not conditioned for the payment of laborers and
materialmen and that they had no right of action against
the Casualty Company; that Capson-Bowman failed to
comply with Section 17-2~1, U.C.A.., 1943, and therefore,
CapS'on-Bowman and Martin were sotely liable to the
plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were estopped to claim liability
on the part of the Casualty Com:pany for the reason
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that they had the right and duty to exan11ne the bond
of the Casualty Company, prior to furnishing of labor
and material and that such examination would have
disclosed that the bond was not conditioned for the payment of laborers and materialmen and they were not
oblig-ees on the b~nd; that defendant Cap·son-B·owman
was liable to plaintiffs for the full amount remaining
unpaid; that defendant Casualty Company was damaged
and prejudiced by reason of the failure· of Ca.pson-Bowman to comply with the provisions of its contract with
Martin in making payments to Martin without requiring
lien waivers and without retaining the 10% required to
be retained. (R. 369-371). The Casualty Company's motion to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law as above indicated was denied. (R. 387)
Judgment was entered decreeing that the sum of
$2,188.33 paid into Court by Cap·son-Bowman be distributed ratably among the plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs
have judgment against the· defendants Martin and the
Casualty C·ompany in the total sum of $6,586.11; that
plaintiffs take nothing under their complaint against
Capson-Bowman; and that the Casualty Company take
nothing on its cross-complaint against Capson-B·owman.
( R. 364-366) .
The Casualty Company's motion for new trial was
denied. (R. 387) .
In detailing the above facts we have attempted to he
brief without omitting any of the essential facts and
without clouding the issues. Since the facts are to a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
large extent without dispute we have taken the liberty
of summarizing the pJeadings without setting them forth
in haec verba. Although the factual situation here involv;ed is not particularly ·complicated, the multiplicity
of parties mal{!es the task of presenting the factual background somewhat difficult. In the hope that it may be
of some assistance to the Court we offer the fo'llowing
summary of the facts as abov~e detailed:
This is a suit by various subcontractors, laborers,
and materialm~en, to recover amounts due to them for
materials furnished and labor performed on a certain
building owned by defendant, Capson-Bowman, and
erected by Martin (contractor). The Casualty Company
is the surety on Martin's Performance Bond. There is
no question as to the amounts due to the various plaintiffs, nor is there any question as to the liability of
Martin (Contractor) to the plaintiffs. The only issue
is as to whether the Casualty Company is liable on its
bond to the plaintiffs, or whether defendant CapsonBowman is liable to p:laintiffs under Section 17-2-2,
U.C.A., 1943, by reason of its failure to procure such
a hond as is r'equired by the terms of S~ection 17-2-1,
or whether Capson-Bowman is liable to the Casualty
Company by reason of i1ts breach of conditions of its
contract with Martin (Contractor).
AS;SIGNMEN'TS O·F ERROR
The appellant assigns as error the following orders
and rulings of the trial Court:
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1. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer
of the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended
Complaint of plaintiff De Luxe Glass Company.

2. The Court ,erred in overruiing the Demurrer of
the Defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Complaint of intervener A. B·ernstein.
3. The Court erred in -overruling the D~emurrer of
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Complaint of intervener R. H. Mulholland.
4. The Court erred in ov~erruling the Demurrer
of the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended
Complaint of intervener Rio Grande Lumber Company.
5. 'The Court erred in overruling th~e Demurrrer of
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Complaint of intervener Morrison-Merrill Company.
6. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer of
the defendant Casualty Comp~any to the Amended Complaint of intervener Wilford W. Gardner.
7. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer of
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amended Complaint of intervener Anderson Lumber Company.
8. The Court :erred in ov;erruling the Demurrer of
the defendant Casualty Company to the Amende·d Complaint of intervener Mill Creek Lumber ·and Transit l\{ix
Company.

9. The Court erred in overruling the Demurrer of
the defendant Casualty Company to the Cross-Complaint
of defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc.
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10. The Count erred in making its Conclusion of
Law No.2. '(R. 360).
11. The Court ·erred in making its Conclusion of
Law No.3. (R. 360).
12. 'The Court erred in making its Conclusion of
Law No.4. (R. 360).
13.. The Court erred in making its Conclusion of
Law No.6·. (R. 361).
14. The Court erred in making that portion of
Finding of Fact N·o. 2 (R. 362) which reads as follows:
''Other Findings of the Court herein made
render it unnecessary to find in further detail
respecting the matter of Compliance by said
owner, Capson-Bowman, Inc., with said retention
provisions.''
15. The Court erred in failing and refusing to
make Findings of Fact as to the tim·e, and amo.unt of
overpayments to defendant George V. Martin by defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc.
16. The Court erred in failing and refusing to make
Findings of Fact as to whetheT or not, and if so in what
amounts, defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc. made payments to defendant George V. Martin without having
first obtained lien waivers, in violation of said construction contract.
17. The Court eTred in making Finding of Fact No.
3 ( R. 362-363) .
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18. The Court erred in making Finding of Fa0t No.
4 (R. 363).
The Court erred in making Conclusion ·of Law
No. 1 (R. 363) .
19.

20. The Court erred in making Conclusion of Law
No.2 (R. 363).
21. The Court in refusing to modify, amend, and
add to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as
proposed by defendant Casualty C~ompany.

22. The Court erred in entering judgme:rut in favor
of plaintiff DeLuxe Glass Comp~any and against the
defendant G~enera1 Casualty· Company of A1nerica.

23. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor
of inter¥ener Mill Creek Lmnber and Transit Mix Company and against defendant General Casualty Company
of America.
24. The Court err·ed in entering judgment in favor
of intervener ].1orrison-J\1:errill C·ompany and against
defendant Casualty Company.
25. 'The Court

~erred

in .entering judgment in favor

of intervener Wilford W. Gardner and against defendant Casualty Company.
26.

The Court erred in entering judgment in favor

of intervener Rio Grande Lumber Comp·any and against
defendant Casualty Company.
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27. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor
of illltervener R. H. Mulholland and against defendant
C·asualty Company.
28. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor
of intervener A. Bernstein and against defendant
Casualty Comp~any.
29. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor
of intervener Anderson Lumber Company and against
defendant Casualty Company.
30. The trial Court erred m entering judgment
agains1t defendant Casualty Company on its Cross-Complaint against defendant Capson-Bowman, Inc.
The trial Court
Motion for a New trial.
31.

~erred

in denying appellant's

ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
At the outset of this argument w·e desire to make
crystal clear, and to emphasize to the Court, •tha.t there
is no issue in this case as to the rights of the plaintiff
and interveners to he paid the full amount of their claims.
So much is admitted by all of the defendants. The real
issue in this case is. as to whether the· surety on the contractor's :performance bond, or the owner of the building
must foot the bill. ·The issue is a purely legal one, de·-
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pending upon a proper construction of the performance
bond, and of 'Title 17, Chapter 2, U. C. A., 1943. 'The
Court need have no reticence to reverse the trial Court
for fear that the rights of the p'laintiffs will be thereby
prejudiced. Their rights will not ·and cannot he defeated.
If the Court is of the opinion that the Casualty Compuny
is liable to plaintiffs on its bond, and was not p~rejudiced
by Caps-on-Bowman's bre·ach of contract, then tth~e judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. If, on the
other hand, the Court is of the opd.nion that the plaintiffs have no right of action against .the Casualty Company on its· bond, the judgment should he re~ersed with
directions to the trial Court to enter judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs against the defendant, Cap~son-Bowman.
And, if the Court should find that the Casualty Company
was liable to the plaintiffs on its bond, and should further find that the Casua~ty Company was prejudiced by
Capson-Bowman's breach of contraci, then the Casualty
Company should have judgment against Capson-Bowman
in an amount equal to the extent of the damage suffered
by it, by reason of Cap~son-Bowman 's brea:ch of contract In any view which the Court may tak~e of the
case, the plaintiffs will be entitled tto and will have a
judgment against a financially resp~onsible party, and
neither the letter nor the s:pd.rit of any statute designed
for the protection of laborers and materialmen will he
defeated.
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POINT I.
THE BOND EXECUTED BY APPELLANT,
AS SURETY, RAN O·NLY TO DEFENDANT
CAPSON-BOW.MAN, INC. AS OBLIGEE, AND
WAS CONDITIONED 0 N.L Y FOR 'THE
FAITHFUL PERFO·RMANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT. THE BOND WAS
NOT INTENDED FOR THE PRO·TEC·TION OF
LABORERS AND MATERIAL·MEN; THEY
ARE . NOT NAMED AS. OBLIGEES; AND
THEY HAVE NO· RIGHTS UNDER IT.
(Assignments of error numbered 1 to 13 inclusive,
and 21 to 31 inclusive are involved in the discussion of
this point.)·
I

It is the position of the appellant, consistently maintained throughout the course of this proceeding, that
the bond e~ecuted by it as surety is conditioned only for
the proper completion of the building hy the contractor;
that Capson-Bowma:ri, Inc. is the sole obligee of the
bond, and is p~rotected only to the extent that the contrac;tor should properly complete the construction work;
that it was never intended by the :parties to the bond
that laborers and materialmen should fall within the
protection of its terms or that 1they shonld have any
rights thereunder; and that such is unambiguously manifest by the plain teTms and conditions of the instrument.
The bond does not fully satisfy the requirements of Section 17-2-1, U.C.A., 1943, and to the extent that it fails
to answer the requirements of that statute, th~e owner
(Capson-Bowman) is liable.
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Section 17-2-1, U. C.A.,' 19±3 proVides as follows :
'' 17-2-1. Bond to Protect Mechanics and
~Iateriaimen.

''The owner of lilly interest in land entering
into a contract involving $500 or more, for the
construction, addition to, or alteration or re:pair
·of, any building, structure or improvement upon
land shall, before any such work is commeneed,
obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal
to the contract p·rice, ·with good and sufficient
sureties, conditi.Joned for the faithful performance
of the ·contract and prompt payment for material
furnished and labor performed unde.r the oontract.
Such bond shall run to the owner and to all other
persons as their irnt·e1iest may 1app~ea.r; and any
person who has furnished materials or. performed
labor for or upon any such building, structure or
improvement, payment for which has not been
made, shall have a direct right of action against
the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable
value of the materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case, the
prices agreed upon; which right of action shall
accrue forty days after the completion, or abandonment, or default in the performance, of the
work provided for in the contract.
''The bond herein provided shall he .exhibited
to any person interested, upon request." (Italics
added)
S~ection

1'7-2-2 provides as follows:

'' 17-2-2.
Liability.

Failure to Require Bond-Direct

''Any person ·subject to fu,e p~rovisions of this
chapter, who shall pail t:o obitlaim such goo1d and
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sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as herein
required, shall be personally liable t:o all persons
who have furnished) maler~als 1or performed labor
under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any ease the prices agreed
upon." (Italics added)

The statutes requiring contractor's bonds are unique,
and different from the statute-s of most other states
dealing with the same subject matter. The statutes of
most states ·are mandatory in their requirement of a contractor's bond. Sometim.es a criminal penalty is attachBd for failure ito comply. However, the Utah statute,
in effect, provides alternative courses. The owner may
follow either of three alternative p·rocedures:
(1) 'The owner may insist. on full financial protection for himself by requiring a bond conditioned both
for !the faithful perf'Ormance· of the contract (Jffl)d for
''prompt paym·ent for material furnished and labor performed under the contract.''
(2) The ovvner ma.y a.ssum.e the entire financial
risk hims-elf by not requiring any bond whatsoever.
( 3) The owner may protect himself agains.t loss
due to failure of the contractor to fully complete the
cons,truction work in accordance with the· terms of the
contract, by requiring a faithful performance bond. At
the same time he may assume the risk of unpaid claims
for labor and material, by his failure to exact from the
contractor a bond conditioned for the satisfaction of
such claims. That is exactly what is con:templated by
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Section 17-2-2. And it is the· contentinn of the app~ellant
that that is exactly what occurred in this case.
The thought above expressed was well staJted b~
Mr. Justice Thurman sp,eaking for the Court in R'io
Grande Lumber ,C,omlp(Jm.Y v. Da)rke, 50 Utah, 114, lH7
Pac. 241, L.R.A. l918A, 1190:
''If the owner requires the contractor to p;rocure the statutory bond, he is proteeted against
loss. If he ·does not, he becomes liable to laborers
and materialmen if the contractor fails to p1ay
them, even though he may have paid the contractor in full. He has hi.s remedy im his own
harnds. '' (Italics added)
See also 57 C.J.S. 5840, M echarnics' !Aens, Sec. 2·57a:
"A building contractor and his surety have a
lega:l right to make any bond, acceptab1e to the
owner, which they see fit to make.''
From the ~earliest days of statehood right down to
the pres-ent, this Court has refused to extend by implication the liability 'Of a surety on a contractor's bond,
and unless the bond is conditioned for the payment of
laborers and materialmen, such p~ersons have no rights
against the sur;ety.
The earliest Utah case treating this question was
Montg'omery v. Spencer, frequentJly cited as Montgomery
v. Rief, 15 Ut 495, 50 Pac. 623. In that case the assignee
of a materialman sued the contractor and the sureties
on his faithful pe-rformance bond. 'The plaintiff had
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judgment against all defendants in the trial Court, and
the sureties appealed. The judgm·ent, as against the
sureties, was revers.ed, with this language:
''We have no disposition to extend the doetrine relating to third parties to new and doubtful cases, and are of the opinion that the bond of
the appellants created no liability in favor of
the respondent (plaintiff)~ that the complaint
stated no cause of action, and that the demurrer
to it ought to have been sustained.''
We quote also, the following pertinent statement
from the opinion of the Court:
"To entitle a third party, who may be benefited by the performanee of a contract, to sue,
there must have been an intention on the part of
the contracting ll'arties to secure some direct benefit to him, or there must be some privity and some
obligation or duty from the promisor to the third
party which will enable him to enforce the contract, or some equitable claim to the benefit resulting from the promise or performance of the
contract, and there must be some legal right on
the part of the third party to adopt and claim the
promise of the contract.... * * * ''
''The promisors, Spencer and Dee [Sureties], made no promise to pay for material and
labor used by Rief in the performance of his contract; and owed no duties to the third P'arties.''
****
'
"'They [Sureties] were liable only to the territory [obligee named in the bond], for the faithful performance of the contract of Rief, to the exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tent of the penalty provided in the bond, and cannot be held liable beyond the terms of their contract. Nor can a new and undefined liability be
established by implication in behalf of a mere
stranger to the contract, "\Yho thereby might hecome incidentally benefited. ' '
In Smith v. Bowmarn, 32 Ut. 33, 88 Pac. 687, 9 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 889, it was h·eld that an unpaid materi~lman
had no right of action against ithe surety on a contractor's bond where the bond was conditioned that thebuilding was free of all liens or right of liens for debts
due from the contractor, and the building was a public
building and therefor·e not subject to· liens. The Court
held .that the "liability [of sureties] is not to be· extended
by impiicati'On beyond the terms of their contract. They
are bownd by rthei,r ~agreement and nothing ~el.se; arnd
they have a right to stand upow the strict term.s of their
obligations.'' (Italics added)
And in Blyth-Fa.rgo Co. v. Free, 46 Ut. 233, 148 Pac.
427, it was held that "although the- third person for
whose benefit ·a contract was made may maintain an
action thereon, nevertheless it must appear from the
provisions of such contract itself, that it was made for
the benefit ·of the plaintiff, either as an individual or as
a member of a contemplated class.'' Syllabus 5, Pacific
Reporter.
We quotH some pertinent observations of the Court:
''We must arrive at the intention of the parties fron1 the bond as written .... ''
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"* * * the surety may define and limit the
scope of his obligation, and if he has done so in
apt terms the Court cannot legally enlarge them.''
''·* * * it must ap·pear from the terms of the
contract, or, as in this case, from the bond, that
its p~rovisions were intended direetly for the benefit of the person who is bringing the action, or
that he belongs to a elass which was intended to
be directly benefited.''
The same thoughts were expressed in the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice :s:traup:
''As to sureties, their liability is not to be
extended by implication beyond the terms of their
·contract. They have the right to stand strictly on
the express terms of it and to insist that they
be not held responsible for any 'liability or obligation not directly expressed within it.''
In Paxton v. Sp-enoer, 71 Ut. 313, 265 Pac. 751, the
court said:
''The liability of the surety must he determined and measured by the terms of the bond.''
The m'Ost recent expression of the Court on the
question which our research has discoveried, is that contained in the opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe in Coriplo.ratvon
of the President of ,Ch!u.r:ch of Jesus C'hrist of Latter-rJay
Slaints v. Hartford Acdt. & Inaem. ·Co. et al., 98 Ut. :2~97,
95 Pac. (2d) 736.
It was there said that ''the liab[lity of the Surety is
based on the bond and only those parties made bene-
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ficiaries by the bond can have an action thereon.'' The
Court cited the Utah cas-es which have heretofore been
discussed, and also the following cases from oth·er jurisdictions which are to the same effect:
Ger. Alliance & Ins. Co. v. Home VViater Swpvp·ly Co.,
226 U. S. 220, 33 S. Ct.- 32, 57 L. 1Ed. 195, 42 L. R. A_.
(N.S.) 1000.
B. F. Sturtevan.t Co. v. FideTJity &
Cir., 285 F. 367.

D~ep,osit

Co., 2nd

Ratl. BOfnk v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. C1o., 95 'Tex. 176,
66 s.w. 203.
Fidelity & Dep,osit Co. v.
So. 55, 77 A.L.R. 13.

R~ainer,

2·20 Ala. 2.62·, 125

Pamkey v. Natl. Suretvy ·Co., 115 Or. 658, 239 Pac.
808.

In view of the Utah cases above discussed, it hardly
seems necessary to look to the decisions of other Courts
for assistance on this question. Howev.er, if further
authority may be helpful, we invite the Court's attention to the following:
9 Am. Jur. 62, Building and Construction Contracts,
Sec. 96:
'' [W] here the bond is designed solely for
the benefit of the formal parties thereto, laborers
and materialmen cannot sue thereon even though
they might derive some incidental, consequential
or remote benefit from its enforcement.''
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Fleck-AtZ(JJYbtic C.o. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N ..A..,
326 Pa. 15, 191 A. 51 :
In this case defendant had

.e~ecuted

as sur·ety a

performance bond for a sub-contractor. The prime contractor was named as obligee. By express provisions of
the bond, the terms of the sub-contract were made a part
of the bond. One of the sub-contractor's unpaid materialmen sued the defendant surety on the bond. The
Court held that the plaintiff had no right of recov,ery
against the surety, saying:
''A bond given pursuant to a contract incorporated in the bond will he eonstrued in the
light of the terms of the -contract and the attendant circumstances, but the obligation of the
bond eannot be extended beyond the plain import
of the words used.' Lancaster v. Frescoln, 192
Pa. 452, 457, 43 A. 961, 962; Erie v. Dief!endorf,
278 Pa. 31, 122 A. 157. '' * * *
"If 1t:h.e parties had intended to i,nclJude ma..
t.erialn~en as parties to be benefiited, ~a few .additional words would have expressed the ag.reement. * * * the Cou.rt may not make a new cont·ract for the p1arties." (Italics added)
Adirondack Core & Plug Co. v. N.Y.C.R. Co. et ·al.,
238 App·. Div. 346, 264 N.Y.S. 484. (Affirmed without
op1nion, 264 N.Y. 439, 191 N.E. 503).
C.rane ·Co. v. Barwick T·renching
319, 32 Pac. (2d) 387.

Corp~.,

138 Cal. App.
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Anno. in 12 A. L. R. 382, 387 :
''The bond of a com·pensated surety is not
to be so construed as to extend his liability beyond the terms of the contract which he has
made.''
The above rule is reaffirmed in the later
annotation in 94 A.L.R. 876, 881.
Ky. Rock Asphalt C·o. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
N.Y., 6th Cir., 37 Fed. ( 2d) 279.
57 C.J.S. 41, Mechanics' Lhens, Sec. 257d.

''In order to render available to the o'vner
the exemptions from, or limitations of, liability
resulting from the taking of a contractor's statutory bond, the bond must b.e oorndit~oned as p>rovided by statute." (Italics added.)
And at p. 846, Sec. 259a:

''Where it is sought to recover from the
sureties on a building contractor's bond for claims
or liens, or damage or loss resulting therefrom,
their liability cannot he extended beyond the
terms of their contract * * *."

Am. Sash & D.oor Co. v. McGregor, (Okla.), 264 P.
602.
The holding of the cas-e is accurately reflected by
syllabus 2: Where officers of a municipality fail to require a bond of a contractor conditione:d as requir~ed hy
statute, hut do require a bond conditioned that the contractor shall f·aithfully pe·rform said contract on his part
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according to the terms, eovenants, and conditions thereof, and the public improvement is eomp~leted by the contractor ·to the satisfaction of the municipality, there is
no breach in conditions of said bond, and the surety is
not liable to a materialman for material furnished the
contractor in -completing the work. The terms. and conditions of such bond cannot be extended by implication.
Said the Court:
"But in the absence of a bond so conditioned,
under the authorities above eited the Court cannot make a new contract or write into a contract,
which is plain and unambiguous, -conditions which
would impose obligations upon the surety beyond
and in excess of the liability; assumed by it. * * *
'The plaintiff was in business ·for profit, and to
that extent was on no different footing than the
bond company. If the plaintiff was not furnishing material to the -contractor solely upon his
financial responsibility, an inspection of the bond
as given would have disclosed that it was not the
statutory bond for the benefit of 'laborers and to
materialmen. While it was the duty of the school
board to have required the statutory bond, it was
also within the option of the defendant Casualty
Company to refuse to sign such a bond, and having signed a bond the conditions of which are not
shown hy the pleadings herein to have been
breached, and the conditions of which did not
go to the extent of paying for material furnished,
the Court cannot make a contract and create a
liability which would save the plaintiff a loss
which it may possibly sustain by reason of its inadvertence in not knowing the character of the
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ing to resort to such bond in the event of nonpayment.''

U. S. use of StaUings v. Starr, 4th Cir., 20 F. (2d)
803:
''Under the lavv of North Carolina, the mere
requirement of the statute· that a bond contain
an obligation does not of itself incorporate the
obligation in the bond. * * * A statutory p·rovision that a bond given under the statute shall
protect the claims of laborers and materialmen,
whether such provision he incorporated in the
bond or not, will he given effeet. * * * But, in
the absence of some such statutory p·rovision, the
Courts will not read into a bond an obligation
which it does not contain.''

Scharbauer v. Lampasses County, (Tex. Civ. App·.),
214 S. W. 468.
O·cala use of Svanda·rd Oil C.o. v. Continenta.l·C:asualty Co., 99 Fla. 736, 127 So. 326:
"[T]here was no duty or obligation of the
surety company to enter into the bond that the
statute requires the -contractor to execute, before
commencing the public work. * * * The bond
of the surety company in this case does not, by its
terms or by reference or otherwise, indicate that
it was given pursuant to, or for the p·urposes designed by, the statute; and as the statute does not
expressly or impliedly forbid giving of such a
bond as was executed, and does not expressly or
hy intendment make the statu·tory provisions apply notwithstanding the terms of the bond, the
liability of the surety company dep.ends upon the
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terms of its bond, which do not cover liability for
labor, material, and supplies used by contractors
in the street improvement provided for in the contract with the City.''

w.

C:ooper v. Hardin & Co., (T·ex. Civ. App.), 219 S.
550:
''We are not permitted to read into this bond
terms and conditions favorable to the plaintiff
and others. If the p~laintiffs had been diligent, they
could have discovered what kind of a bond had
been given, and whether such bond protected the
materialmen.''
Acme B·rick Cio. v. Tai!Jlor, (Tex. Civ. App.), 223

s. w. 248.
Teriry v. Soulhwes tern Bldg. Co., (Cal. App.), 185
Pac. 212.
1

We have not attempted here to cite all of the authorities in our favor. W·e are awar~e of other authorities to
the same eff·ect, and we are confident that many more
could be produced. We are also aware that ther~e are
many cases holding to the contrary, and we are confident
that such cases will he cit,ed to the C'Ourt by respondents.
No attempt has been made by us to exhaust the field.
The eas·es treating the question of the liability of a
surety on a -contractor's bond to unpaid laborers and
materialmen are legion. Thfany views have been expressed. The cases in many instances turn upon the existence or non-existence of controlling statutes; the language of the bond; the terms of the contract; and other
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circumstances surrounding the parties. The 'best treatment of the entire question which we have discovered is
that contained in the Annotation in 77 A. L. R. commencing at page 21 and continuing for approximately
200pages.
At page 77 of fu.e Annotation it is said:
''The Courts seem to be generally agreed
that a laborer or materialman cannot recover on
a contractor's bond to the owner, unless the
parties to the instrument contemplated some benefit to such third parties ; and the trend of the
decisions is to make the rights of laborers and
materia1men dependent up·on an intention ·of the
parties to pro teet them.''
The author of the Annotation, R. I. Kimbrough, concludes the treatise with a resume and conclusion commencing at page 212. At page 213 he says:
''According to the prevailing rule, the right
of laborers and materialmen to recover on a contractor's bond depends upon the terms of the instrument. * * * It depends upon whether the bond
is actually for the benefit of such p~ersons, or is
for the protection of the nominal obligee and
merely incidentally benefits the third parties. * * *
''Where the bond is conditioned merely to
indemnify and hold harmless the owner or p·uhlic
body, it seems, both by authority and reason, that
it does not inure to the benefit of laborers and
materialmen so as to enable them to recover
thereon. * * * While the p·erformance of this
condition may incidentally benefit such third
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parties, it does not necessarily do so. As pointed
out hy P'rofessor Corbin in 38 Yale L. J. 1, 14,
even if they have a right to a lien on the obligee's
personal property, they may not perfect it, or
their liens may he discharged in some other way
than hy paying their claims. And svuch a corndition
ce.rtlainly does wot ~amovwnt to ~an undertakim..g to
pay such pers1ons." (Italics added.)
The Annotation in 77 A. L. R. is sup~plemented by
a later one in 118 A. L. R., commencing at prage 57, to
which we also invite the Court's attention.
On the basis of s1-tlare ·decisi:s alone, 'the decision of
the trial Court should be reversed. This Court has rep~eatedly refused to extend to laborers and materialmen
the protection of a contractor's bond conditioned only for
faithful performance, and not for the benefit of laborers
and materialmen. For many years now property owners,
building contractors, an9. surety companies have contract:ed in the light of those decisions. If they ar:e now
to be overturned, and the principles therein asserted renounced, who can say how many sureties will suddenly
find their liahili ty on exe-cuted bonds .extended far beyond their intent, and far beyond what they have been
paid to assume; and at the same time many land-owners
may suddenly find

the.ms~elves

protected to a point. far

in excess of what they expected or requested or paid for.
If the rule heretofore laid down by the Court is to he
changed, such change ought to be effected by legislative,
not judicial action, so that all parties concerned with construction bonds may contract in the light of lmown rules.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35
The rule heretofore laid down by this Court is a
good rule. There is no reason 'vhy surety companies
should be saddled with financial obligations, when they
were not paid to assum·e the risks. While it is tru·e that
the Casualty Company here is in the business of acting
as surety on bonds, and is paid therefore, it is likewise
true that Capson-Bowman, Inc. is -engaged in th·e real
estate business for profit, and Martin was engaged in
the construction business for profit. All of ihe parties
to this action were engaged in business. .They dealt at
arms length. Caps-on-Bowman could have insisted that
Martin procure a bond conditioned for the payment of
laborers and materialmen. It did not do so. The various
plaintiffs were ~entitled to examine the bond. They could
have determined the extent of the bonding protection
which the owner had purchased.
There is nothing in the languag,e of the bond to even
hint that laborers and materiahnen should fall within
its protection. It is called a '' p~erformanee bond'' and
by way of further explanation the word ''construction''
is contained in parentheses imrnediately under the title.
of the bond. Capson-Bowman is the sole obligee named,
and the sole condition is that the principal (Martin) shall
well and truly perform all the agre·ements of the eontract.
The plaintiffs are strangers to the terms of the
bond. To give them a right of action against the surety
is to write a new contract imposing liabilities far heyond those contemplated or intended to be assumed by
the parties. In justice and in fairness, as well as on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36

logic and precedent, the judgment of the trial Court
should be reversed.
POINT II.
IF THE CO·UR:T SHOUL.D HOLD THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS HAD A RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT CASUALTY
COMPANY, THEN 'THE CASUALTY COMPANY IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT
AGAINST CAPS:O·N-BOWMAN, INC. TO THE
EXTENT THAT IT WAS PREJUDICED BY
CAPSON BO·WMAN'S BREACH OF ITS CONTRACT WITH MARTIN.
(Assignments of error numbered 14 to 21
inclusive, 30 and 31 are involved in the discussion
of this· point).
We have already argued at some length that the
Casualty Company was not liable in its bond to the plaintiffs. We hope that in advancing our second point we
will not be understood as eonfessing weakness under
Point I. W.e a.re firmly of the opinion that the position
maintained by us under P:oint I is correct, and if the
Court rules as we contend that it should, it will be unnecessary to consider Point II. However, we feel that
we would be derelict in our duty both ·to the Court and
to our client, if we did not advance the argument presented under Point II. And if we do not prevail under
Point I, then we are entitled to prevail under Point II.
Under the terms of ~the contract between CapsonBowman and Martin, Capson-B·o~an was required to
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withhold 10% of the eontract price until lVIartin had
satisfactorily completed the work. No payments were
to be made until M·artin produced satisfactory lienwaivers from the laborers and materialmen. It is undisputed that both of these provisions were violated by
Capson-Bowman.
Appellant has -consistently maintained and now
maintains that the failure of Capson-Bowman to comp~ly
with the provisions of this contract was prejudicial to it,
and if plaintiffs have a right of action against appellant,
then appellant is entitled to a right of action over as
against Capson-Bowman, and is entitled to a judgment
against it, at least in the amount that appellant was
prejudiced by Capson-Bowman 's breach of contract.
It was ap,parently the view of the trial Court that
the plaintiff had the burden of showing the existence
and extent of any prejudice suffered by it as a result of
Capson-Bowman's breach, and that since no oral ~testi
mony was taken, appellant failed to sustain its burden of
proof on the Cross-Complaint. It is our position that
the stipulation of counsel as to the paym.ents made by
Capson-Bowman, together with the documents which
comprise exhibit 5, is sufficient not only to authorize
but to comp~el a finding of prejudice to a~ppellant.
I

The payments made by Capson-Bowman are shown
by the Stipulation (R. 348-349) and are set forth in the
statement of facts.
The third payment made .by Cap~son-Bowman to
l\fartin was on May 11, 1946, was in the sum of $2, 722.31,
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as evidenced by check No. 3089, contained in Exhibit 5.
No lien waive·rs whatsoever were furnished to ·CapsonBowman for payment of this claim. All that was furnished were two receipts by Martin acknowledging payment of $2,076.60 and $695.71 by Capson-Bowman and
agre·eing with Zion's Savings Bank and Trust Company
that any liens on Caps-on-Bowman's property should be
inferior to a mortgage on said p~roperty held by said
hank. C.ertainly this was no p·rotection either to CapsonBowman or to appellant. It was merely an agr~e,ement
between two persons holding se:eurity interests in Capson-Bowman's property as to the priority of such interests.
'The fourth payment of $2,474.50 was made on July
8, 1946, as evidenced by check No. 3406 and was wholly
unsupported by lien waive-rs of any kind.
The payment made on August 1'7, 1946, in the sum
of $2,977.00 as evidenced by check No. 3646 was supported by lien waivers in the total sum of only $1,436.91,
so that there was a payment unsupported by lien waivers,
in the sum of $1,540.09.
Two payments made on November 7, 1946, in the
total sum of $1,200.00 evidenced by checks numbered 4108
and 4109 we-r·e wholly unsupported by lien waivers of any
kind.
On the payment of $3,063.17 made November 22,
1946, as evidenced hy check No. 416·5, lien waivers by E.
K. Fuller in the amount of $264.75; Dean Amundsen in
the amoun~t of $17.25 and D. D. Jordan in the amount of
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$13.36 were never signed. Hence $295.36 of this p~ay
ment was unsupported by lien waivers.
The final ~payments of $386.70; $150.00; and $390.45,
made on January 17, 1947, as evidenced by checks numbered 4801, 4802 and 4803, were all unsupported by lien
waivers of any kind.
The final ·contract p-rice, after additions and ·deductions was $32,406.00. Cap·son-Bowman was bound to
withhold 10% or $3,240.60 until after satisfactory completion of the contract. T·he amount actually withheld by
Capson-Bowman, (and later paid into Court) was $2,188.31. "Thus there was an additional unauthorized payment of $1,052.29.
The total amount of unauthorized payments is $10,211.70 which is more than the amount of the judgment
agains·t appellant. That the surety -company was prejudiced by such impro~per payments is easily demonstrated.
It requires but little imagination to see that the failur:e
to withhold 10% -of the contract priee was p·r.ejudicial
to the Casualty Company. If ·the full10% had been withheld there would have been an additional $1052.29 in the
"kitty'' which was paid into Court, and there would
therefore, hav-e been that much more for plaintiffs and
that much less that the Ca:sual·ty Company would have
been liable to pay.
The only fair conclusion that can he drawn from
the failure to require lien waivers is th'at the Casualty
Company was thereby prejudiced. It seems certain that
if Capson-Bowman had insisted on lien waivers before
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payment of advances to the Contractor, that either payments would have been made to the plaintiffs by the
contractor,

or ·that enough money would have been with-

held by Capson-Bowman to satisfy such claims.
It is the general rule that a material departure by
the owner, without the consent of the surety, from the
express requir1ements of a construction contract with
regard to time, method, manner or amounts of payments
made to the -contractor, opera:tes to rele·ase or discharge
from liability to the own·er the surety on the Contractor's
bond, at least to the eX'tent that such unauthorized payments result in injury or prejudice to the surety. Provisions in -construction contracts requiring the owner to
retain certain percentages of the contract price, are not
only for the protection of the owner, but also for the
benefit of the surety on the contractor's bond.

See

127 A. L. R. 10, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, · 22 and ·23.
The rule is stated thus by Willis'ton:
''The obvious :prejudice to a surety from the
surrender by the creditor of security held by
him has established the rule that such a surrender discharges the surety to the extent of the
value of the security surrendered''. 4 Wil•liston
on Contracts 3529, Sec. 1232. See also Sec. 1243,
pp. 3559-3561.
See to the same effect Ste,a.rns, Law .of Suretyship,
p·p. 107e, 108, Sec. 76h.
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The rules above stated have been followed in this
jurisdiction. In Raxtorn v. Spencer, 71 Ut. 313, 265 P. 751,
the Court said :
''Conditions or provisions requiring the retention of 10 per cent. of a contract until the
completion of the work are, under all of the authorities, binding upon the parties to the contract.
Such provisions are clearly made for the benefit
of the surety as well as for the contractors and, as
stated by some courts, are an incentive to make
the contractor complete the work according to
the terms of the agreement. * * * ' '
The Court went on to hold that the release of the
surety should be limited to the pro tanto amount of the
damage sustained by him by reason of the owner's
breach. Appellant, of course, contends that the breach
in this case damaged it to the full e~tent of its liability
to the plaintiffs.
The doctrine of Paxton v. SpBncer was reaffirmed
in Latter-day S,fiAifnts Church v. Hartford Acdt. & Indeni.

Co., 98 Ut. 297, 95 Pac. (2d) 736. The Court in that
case also recognized that a breach hy ~the owner might,
in some cases op~erate as a full release of ~the surety.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Wolf,e the Court said :
''There may he some breaches that would
work a full release of the surety.... "
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In view of the foregoing authorities, the appellant
is entitled, as a matter of law, to a judgment against Capson-Bowman to the extent of any riability of appellant to
any of the plaintiffs in this

cas~e.

CONCLUSION
The judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against appellant should be reversed. 'The bond on which appellant
was surety was strictly a performance bond. The sole
oblige·e on the bond was the owner, Capson-Bowman.
The sole condition was completion of the building in aceordance with the specifications of the contract.

The

condition was never hre'ached. The bond not being conditioned for the payment of laborers and materialmen;
and they not being obligees on the bond; and there being
no breach of any conditions of the bond, the plaintiffs
have no right of action against appellant, and the judgment in their favor and against appellant should be reversed.
If the judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against
appellant is permitted to stand, then the Court should
O-rder that judgment be entered in favor of appellant on
its Cross-Com:plaint againS't Capson-Bowman, Inc., for
the reason that appe11ant was prejudiced by reason of
Capson-Bowman's breach of its contract with l\1a:rtin.
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In any vie'v of the case, both on reason and logic,
·eqmty and fairness, and judicial p·r·ecedent,
entitled to be exonerated from liability.

ap~p~ellant

is

Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR E. MORETON,
RAY R. CHRISTENSEN,
Attorneys for Defendant and Ap'Pellxunt
Genef"!al C~aswalty C·o~pany of Amerioa,
a corporation.
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